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I.

INTRODUCTION

In a 2007 article adeptly titled “Doling Out Other People’s Money,” the New York Times
reported on a $22 million settlement in the antitrust class action lawsuit, Fears v. Wilhelmina
Model Agency,2 initiated by fashion models against model management companies for price
fixing.3 Judge Harold Baer, a judge in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New
York, ordered $6 million in residual funds, the leftover money after compensation has been made
to eligible class claimants, to be distributed to charitable organizations whose purposes had no
direct relation to either antitrust matters or fashion models.4 Instead, the judge “doled” out the
money to programs that would provide a benefit to what he believed best characterized the class,
women in general, based on the fact that the class representatives just happened to be all female
models, even though he acknowledged that male models comprised approximately 40% of the
class.5 The seven recipients of the residual funds included an eating disorders program, a
substance abuse program, an ovarian cancer center, two heart disease projects focused on
women, and a legal aid society.6 In approving the “charitable route”7 of distributing the leftover
money, the judge looked at two prior antitrust settlements from other jurisdictions where the
courts concluded that it was permissible and, indeed, equitable, to donate the funds to a wide
range of public interest organizations unrelated to the lawsuit.8

2

No.01 Civ.4911(HB), 2005 WL 1041134 (S.D.N.Y. May 5, 2005).
Adam Liptak, Doling Out Other People’s Money, N.Y. TIMES, November 27, 2007, at Sidebar.
4
Id.; see also Fears, 2005 WL 1041134, at *12.
5
Fears, 2005 WL 1041134, at *11.
6
Id. at *12.
7
Id. at *11.
8
Id. at *10-11.
3
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Distributing class action settlement funds in this fashion is known as a cy pres
distribution, which is a growing, yet largely unregulated, practice in courts across the nation.9
When applied in the class action settlement context, the cy pres doctrine (which is borrowed
from trust law and is also referred to as the “next best use” doctrine) traditionally requires that
settlement funds be used in a manner that provides as much indirect benefit as possible to both
the injured class members and the issues underlying the lawsuit when direct compensation is not
feasible.10
Just how indirect or tangential the benefit can be, however, is the controversy currently
surrounding cy pres distributions.11 A class action settlement can adhere closely to the next best
use idea, as illustrated in Nelson v. Gadsden Housing Authority,12 where funds leftover after
compensating tenants for their landlord’s failure to grant them a utility allowance were ordered
to be used by the landlord to increase the energy efficiency of the apartments.13 On the other
hand, a cy pres distribution may largely deviate from a strict application of the doctrine, as
described in Fears, where – in the New York Times writer’s somewhat sardonic terms – the court
decided to “use the leftover money for programs that would indirectly help the entire class of
skinny women prone to drug addiction.”14
This article examines the widespread and inconsistent use of cy pres distributions arising
from class action settlements. Part II discusses the cy pres doctrine’s theoretical and practical
application in class action settlements, as well as the discrepancy between the two. Part III looks
9

NEED CITE
See, e.g., Tim A. Thomas, Annotation, Permissible Methods of Distributing Unclaimed Damages in Federal Class
Action, 107 A.L.R. Fed. 800 (1992), at §3(b).
11
A recent Note addressed the similar question of cy pres distributions in the context of class action settlements, but
with a focus on the option of returning residual funds to defendants. Sam Yospe, Cy Pres Distributions in Class
Action Settlements, 2009 Colum. Bus. L. Rev. 1014, 1017 (2009). The dissimilar scope and implications discussed
in this article leads to a different conclusion.
12
802 F.2d 405 (11th Cir. 1986).
13
Id. at 409.
14
Liptak, supra note 2, at Sidebar.
10
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at three alternative approaches to distributing residual funds and concludes that a cy pres
distribution scheme is usually the best approach. Part IV questions the need for more uniform
regulations over cy pres distributions and, if needed, who should enforce such rules and what
mechanisms should be employed to do so. This part also analyzes some of the existing state
laws that govern cy pres awards. Lastly, Part V concludes that government regulation or
supervision by an independent body would not necessarily reduce the occurrence of erroneous
applications of the cy pres doctrine in the class action context and would likely place severe
limits on judicial discretion. Instead, to increase the consistency and fairness of cy pres
distributions, greater transparency must be given to the settlement proceedings.
II.

THE CY PRES DOCTRINE
A. Origins of the Cy Pres Doctrine

The cy pres doctrine is a term originating from Law French, an archaic language with its
roots in Norman, French, and English that was used in English courts from the eleventh to
seventeenth centuries.15 Cy pres, an abbreviation of “cy pres comme possible,” translates into
“as nearly as possible.”16 At common law, if a settlor’s objective for a charitable trust becomes
impossible or illegal to carry out, a court has the power to modify the terms of the trust in order
to fulfill the settlor’s intent as closely as possible.17 A classic example is Jackson v. Phillips,18
where the testator provided for the establishment of a trust to abolish African-American slavery
and aid fugitive slaves in the United States.19 Shortly after the testator’s death, the U.S.
Constitution was amended to end slavery,20 thus rendering the purpose of the trust moot. The

15

CITE NEEDED
CITE NEEDED
17
CITE NEEDED
18
14 Allen 539 (Mass. 1867).
19
Id. at 540.
20
Id.
16
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Jackson court applied the cy pres doctrine and held that in, keeping with the testator’s intent, the
money should, instead, be used to provide education to freed slaves and help poor AfricanAmericans in the city where the testator had lived.21
In the United States, the cy pres doctrine is codified in both individual state laws and Section
413 of the Uniform Trust Code (UTC),22 a model code that a number of states have adopted
either verbatim or as a model for major legislative reform.23 In addition to the original common
law definition allowing changes when the objective of a trust becomes illegal or impossible, the
UTC has broadened the scope of the doctrine to allow courts to apply cy pres principles when a
trust’s purpose becomes “impracticable” or “wasteful,” and not just impossible or illegal.24 An
impracticable purpose is one that is unreasonable or not feasible to accomplish, even though it is
still possible to do so.25 A wasteful situation is defined as one where the amount of trust money
“exceeds what is needed for the particular charitable purpose to such an extent that the continued
expenditure of all the funds for that purpose, although possible to do, would be wasteful.26 In
this situation, a court can direct the surplus trust funds to a “like purpose in a different
community” or a “different but reasonably similar charitable purpose.”27 Besides the addition of
these two types of purposes, Section 413 also alters the common law rule in that it “creates a
presumption of general charitable intent” by prohibiting courts from giving the trust funds to a
non-charity, unless the settlor expressly allowed it to do so.28
B. Cy Pres Doctrine in the Class Action Context

21

Id. (allowing cy pres in the abolitionist context but disparately not allowing cy pres in the universal suffrage
context, despite the fact that both would represent changes in the equal rights laws of the country).
22
Cy-pres Doctrine, supra note 13.
23
CITE NEEDED
24
Uniform Trust Code § 413 (Nat’l Conference of Comm’rs of Unif. State Laws 2005).
25
In re Trust of Lowry, 885 N.E.2d 296, 300 (Ohio Ct. App. 2008).
26
Id. at 301 (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS §67 (2003)).
27
Id. (citation omitted).
28
Uniform Trust Code Art. 4.
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i.

History

Courts in the 1970s, particularly those in California, institutionalized the practice of cy
pres distributions in class actions.29 The important case, State of California v. Levi Strauss &
Co., laid out the concept of applying the cy pres doctrine in class action settlements and
delineated factors to consider when deciding whether a cy pres distribution would be
appropriate.30 Confronted with a large residual fund following an antitrust class action
settlement, the court in Levi Strauss turned to the equitable doctrine of cy pres, more specifically
referred to as “fluid recovery” in class action cases, and held that “[f]luid recovery may be
essential to ensure that the policies of disgorgement or deterrence are realized. Without fluid
recovery, defendants may be permitted to retain ill gotten gains simply because their conduct
harmed large numbers of people in small amounts instead of small numbers of people in large
amounts.”31
The defendant in this case, Levi Strauss, a popular denim jeans manufacturer, was
accused of pressuring clothing stores to overcharge for its jeans.32 In opting to settle, Levi
Strauss agreed to pay $3 to customers who had proof they purchased the overpriced jeans.33
However, only a few class members had retained sales receipts and, consequently, only a few
were eligible for compensation.34 To prevent the defendant from keeping the “ill gotten gains,”
the court considered four possible methods of distributing the funds35: a cy pres distribution and
three other methods, which will be discussed in Part III below. The court concluded that a cy

29

S. Gale Dick, Fluid Recovery: Flexible Ways to Settle Cases, 13 ALTHCL 73, 81 (1995).
715 P.2d 564 (Cal. 1986).
31
Id. at 570-71.
32
Id. at 565.
33
Id.
34
Id.
35
Levi Strauss, 715 P.2d at 571.
30
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pres distribution going towards the creation of two consumer protection trust funds would
ultimately provide the most indirect benefit to the class of wronged consumers.36
As a side note, although the terms “cy pres distribution” and “fluid recovery” are used
interchangeably in class action cases, over the years a slight distinction has been made between
the two.37 Fluid recovery is a method used to distribute residual funds – funds that remain only
after the defendant has paid its total damages over into a class fund and individual class members
have been given an opportunity to collect their shares.38 In contrast, while “cy pres distribution”
can be used as an identical description for what a fluid recovery does, it is broader in that it is not
limited to residual funds.39 The court in the federal fraud case of In re Mexico Money Transfer
Litigation,40 involving a class of over 13.5 million members, many of whom were undocumented
immigrants, stated that approval of a cy pres distribution “does not depend on its being
composed of residual or unclaimed funds.”41 Given the immense difficulty of locating and
eliciting claims from millions of people, especially from undocumented immigrants fearful of
coming forward in case their illegal status were to be discovered, the court decided to set aside a
large portion of the settlement funds specifically for a cy pres distribution to Mexican and
Mexican-American public interest projects that would indirectly benefit the class members.42
ii.

Factors in Determining a Cy Pres Distribution

When a court is left with residual funds from a class action settlement, it is typically due
to one of three scenarios that commonly occur in class action lawsuits. First, it is often difficult
to locate all class members and notify them to collect their share of the settlement because of the
36

Id. at 576.
Alexandra D. Lahav, Absence Makes the Heart Grow Fonder: Dead Souls, Phantom Clients and the Modem
Class Action, in 40 STUD. IN L. P. SOC’Y 153, 178 (Austin Sarat ed., 2007).
38
Id.
39
Id.
40
164 F.Supp. 2d 1002 (N.D. Ill. 2000).
41
Id. at 1011, 1031.
42
Id. at 1031.
37
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sheer size or ambiguity of a particular class.43 Examples of a large class include the 13.5
million-member class in Mexico Money Transfer Litigation, as discussed above, and the class in
Daar v. Yellow Cab Co., where the class members that needed to be tracked down were
individuals who had used Yellow Cab Company’s taxicab services in Los Angeles sometime
during a period of four years.44 An example of an ambiguous class is found in Committee on
Children’s Television, Inc. v. General Foods Corp., a case where a coalition of public health and
consumer organizations sued on behalf of unnamed plaintiffs – some of whom were described as
children and their parents in the entire state of California who were allegedly misled by the false
advertisement of General Foods’ sugary cereals as nutritious.45
The second scenario that would give rise to residual funds is when eligible class members
fail to submit claims46 or do not have the documentation to prove they are members of the
class.47 Class members in Yellow Cab and Levi Strauss, for instance, would have had difficulty
filing valid claims without a taxicab or sales receipt, an item that most people do not keep or
receive.48
The third and final situation resulting in leftover settlement funds occurs when the
administrative cost of compensating eligible class members exceeds the individual economic
damages suffered by each class member.49 For example, spending $5.50 in processing costs to
mail a thirty-eight cent check to a class member “would be absurd,” according to the In Re Wells

43

Natalie A. DeJarlais, The Consumer Trust Fund: A Cy pres Solution to Undistributed funds in Consumer Class
Actions, 38 HASTINGS L.J. 729, 730 (1987).
44
Daar v. Yellow Cab Co., 433 P.2d 732, 736 (Cal. 1967).
45
Committee on Children’s Television, Inc. v. General Foods Corp., 673 P.2d 660, 663 (Cal. 1983).
46
DeJarlais, supra note 43, at 730.
47
Anna L. Durand, An Economic Analysis of Fluid Class Recovery Mechanisms, 34 STAN L. REV. 173 n.3 (1981).
48
See id.
49
Dejarlais, supra note 43, at 755-56.
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Fargo Securities Litigation court, where a residual fund of $35,000 was to be divided among
2,619 class members.50
Following any of these three scenarios, a court can choose to invoke the cy pres doctrine
to distribute the residual funds. In doing so, several key factors must be applied in determining
the best use for the money. Early cases, such as Levi Strauss, held that the cy pres distribution
must fulfill the purposes of the lawsuit’s underlying causes of action and satisfy the policies of
deterrence and disgorgement with regards to the wrongdoer.51 Post-Levi Strauss cases, while
agreeing with the importance placed on considering underlying issues, have expanded on the list
of factors. One case, Schwartz v. Callas Cowboys Football Club, Ltd., cites three additional
elements that should be looked at: (1) objectives of underlying statutes, (2) interests of class
members, and (3) geographic scope of the case.52 Schwartz, an antitrust case, rejected a proposal
by the plaintiff to distribute residual funds to a law school clinic in Pennsylvania, because doing
so would not further the objectives of the Sherman and Clayton Acts and, due to the national
scope of the case, would not benefit class members living in states other than Pennsylvania.53
Another case, In re Airline Ticket Commission Antitrust Litigation,54 has advised examining the
interests of not just class members, but also persons similarly situated to class members.55 The
court, in Airline Ticket, which involved cuts in commissions paid to travel agencies by airlines,
held that, even though travel agencies in Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands were not class
members, they should not have been precluded from the cy pres distribution “since they were
affected by the commission caps; they were ‘the next best class.’”56

50

In re Wells Fargo Securities Litigation, 991 F. Supp. 1193, 1194 & 1196 (N.D. Cal. 1998).
California v. Levi Strauss & Co., 715 P.2d 564, 570-71 (Cal. 1986).
52
Schwartz v. Dallas Cowboys Football Club, Ltd. 362 F. Supp. 2d 574, 576 (E.D. Pa. 2005).
53
Id. at 576-577.
54
268 F.3d 619 (8th Cir. 2001).
55
Thomas, supra note 10.
56
Airline Ticket, 268 F.3d at 626.
51
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More recently, in a sharp deviation from Levi Strauss-type analysis, a small group of
cases (including Fears v. Wilhelmina) have stated that, because the cy pres doctrine has
significantly evolved from its traditional definition, a modern interpretation allows for the
distribution of settlement funds to organizations whose aims are completely unrelated to those
derived from the lawsuit.57
As can be seen from these conflicting outcomes, a court is not bound by a single set of
rules when it comes to structuring a cy pres distribution. The wide spectrum of decisions as to
what constitutes an appropriate cy pres distribution is due to such variables as the unique facts of
each case and the subjective agendas of all parties involved: courts, class members, defendants,
attorneys, and potential cy pres recipients. The next section looks at the spectrum of cases that
showcase the diverse range of cy pres distributions and the varying proximity of those
distributions to the traditional principles of the cy pres doctrine.
iii.

Cy Pres Distributions in Practice
1. As nearly as possible: a strict application of the cy pres doctrine

The previously mentioned case of Nelson v. Gadsden is an example of when the cy pres
distribution provides a benefit that is as near as possible to a benefit class members would have
received if they were directly compensated.58 In Nelson, tenants who were injured by their
landlord’s refusal to give them a federally-mandated allowance for utility usage benefited from a
cy pres distribution ordering the landlord to improve the energy efficiency of the tenants’
apartments,59 thereby, ultimately resulting in lower utility costs. Similarly, in Market Street
Railways Company v. Railroad Commission, train riders who were overcharged by the railway
57

See, e.g. Fears v. Wilhelmina Model Agency, Inc. No. 02-Civ.4911(HB), 2005 WL 1041134, at *10-*11
(S.D.N.Y. May 5, 2005); Thomas, supra note 10.
58
Robert E. Draba, Motorsports Merchandise: A Cy Pres Distribution Not Quite “As Near As Possible,” 16 LOY.
CONSUMER L. REV. 121, 134 (2004).
59
Nelson v. Gadsden Housing Authority, 802 F.2d 405, 409 (11th Cir. 1986).
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company gained a close benefit when the company was ordered to use residual funds to improve
the transportation facilities that those riders used.60
In Powell v. Georgia-Pacific Corporation, an employment discrimination case where
race was the basis for discrimination, the court approved a cy pres distribution to fund
scholarships for minority students in the three counties where the class members lived.61
Although the class members themselves were adult workers, not students, the class still benefited
indirectly, since the distribution centered around addressing the underlying issue of racial
discrimination and was limited to the areas in which the class members resided.62 Moreover, the
court stated that such a distribution would satisfy the class members’ intent: a “desire to have the
scholarships benefit the class members’ younger relatives.”63
Class action cases such as Nelson, Market Street Railways, and Powell involve
circumstances that make it easier to create a satisfactory cy pres distribution when considering
the factors of class interests, underlying issues of the case, and relevant laws. The small scope of
the cases, in terms of geographic area, size of the class, and easily identifiable injuries to class
members makes them more manageable and, hence, simpler to provide indirect benefits that are
appropriate and fair when applied to all elements. Unfortunately, as the scope of a case grows
and facts and issues become more varied, far-reaching, and complex, the nexus between the
traditional theory of the cy pres doctrine and the actual cy pres distribution becomes more
attenuated.
2. More distantly related: a flexible application of the cy pres
doctrine

60

Market Street Railway Company v. Railroad Commission, 171 P.2d 875, 880-81 (Cal. 1946).
Powell v. Georgia-Pacific Corporation, 119 F.3d 703, 704, 707 (8th Cir. 1997).
62
Id. at 705.
63
Id. at 707.
61
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Class action settlement funds intended for a vast number of class members will inevitably
generate a sizeable portion of leftover money, for reasons previously discussed, such as the
difficulty of notifying all class members of their right to make a claim. In ordering a cy pres
distribution, courts have attempted to give an indirect benefit to these “silent” class members
(those who have not made a claim or are ineligible for an award) in two general ways. The first
way is for a court to donate cy pres funds to existing organizations that deal with issues related to
the underlying matters or interests of class members in the class action lawsuit.64 The second
way is to create a trust fund – one that acts like a foundation and provides grants to projects
seeking to achieve objectives related to the class action.65
Examples of the first type of distribution to an existing organization are Starr v. Fleet
Finance, Inc.66 and Vasquez v. Avco Financial Services.67 Starr was a predatory lending case in
which cy pres funds were given to a legal aid society that aided low-income victims of predatory
lending.68 Even though the class members might not have been the direct recipients of assistance
from the legal aid society, they still received an indirect if distant benefit by having an
organization help fight against the issue of abusive lending practices at large.69 In Vasquez, class
members were illegally charged higher interest rates on loans, leading the court to entrust
residual funds to a consumer protection group called the “Consumers Union,” which, in turn, had
to use the money for “administrative, legislative, legal, research, education, and direct service

See California v. Levi Strauss & Co., 715 P.2d 564, 573 (Cal. 1986) (holding that “to further the purposes of the
substantive law and provide indirect compensation to class members…some courts have allocated the funds directly
to responsible private organizations”).
65
Dejarlais, supra note 43, at 759.
66
No. 9210-2314-06 (Cobb County Ga. Super. Ct. filed Apr. 3, 1992).
67
No. NCC 11933 (Los Angeles Sup. Ct. filed Apr. 24, 1984).
68
Draba, supra note 58, at 135-36.
69
Id.
64
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projects to benefit those [class members] who would otherwise have received [their share of the
settlement].”70
An example of the second type of distribution (towards creating a trust fund) is seen in
Levi Strauss. In response to Levi Strauss overcharging consumers for its clothing, the court
ordered the creation of two trust funds intended to support programs the main mission of which
was to provide consumer protection services.71 Another example is the Telecommunications
Education trust, a trust fund established using over $16 million in residual settlement money
from a case against the Pacific Bell telephone company for deceitful marketing practices. 72 The
fund has been used to award grants to a large number of organizations for projects designed to
educate the public on telecommunications issues, including the creation of a hotline that answers
people’s questions on privacy rights related to telecommunications.73
Beyond trust funds and direct donations to charitable organizations, a cy pres distribution
does not always have to take a monetary form. An interesting example of a non-monetary cy
pres distribution is In re Compact Disc Minimum Advertised Price Antitrust Litigation, an
antitrust case involving a conspiracy by distributors and retailers to inflate the cost of music
products, where the court ordered 5.6 million compact discs to be distributed to libraries and
schools in forty-three states to allow the public to enjoy them for free.74
3. Cy loin comme possible (as far as possible): a questionable
application of the cy pres doctrine
Deviating as far as possible from the traditional concept of the cy pres doctrine, there are
several cases that have approved the concept of using cy pres funds for purposes unrelated to the
70

Dejarlais, supra note 43, at 760-61.
Dick, supra note 29, at 81-82.
72
Id. at 82.
73
Id.
74
In re Compact Disc Minimum Advertised Price Antitrust Litigation, 216 F.R.D. 197, 199-200 (D. Me. 2003);
Draba, supra note 58, at 137.
71
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issues or interests of class members in a class action suit. Fears v. Wilhelmina is one such case,
where the court relied on the In re Motorsports Merchandise Antitrust Litigation case in
implying that the equitable nature of the cy pres doctrine allows for the removal of the factor
requiring benefits to be used as nearly as possible for the purposes of the class action.75
Motorsports Merchandise involved an allegation of price-fixing brought by consumers
against vendors of NASCAR (National Association for Stock Car Auto Racing) merchandise.76
After initial distribution of the settlement, $2.4 million in residual funds were shared among
various organizations including Duke University Medical Center, Susan G. Komen Breast
Cancer Foundation, three heath care programs, and two law school clinics77 – all organizations
that essentially had no relation with either NASCAR, fans of NASCAR who purchased the
merchandise, or antitrust laws.78 The court in Motorsports Merchandise cited two cases that it
believed expanded the scope of the cy pres doctrine and gave it the authority to distribute funds
to organizations that did not even have a remote nexus to the underlying NASCAR theme of the
class action.79
Another price-fixing case, Superior Beverage Co., Inc. v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., here
concerning the price of glass containers, distributed residual funds to law school clinics and legal
aid organizations working on issues such as criminal justice, health care law, civil rights, and

75

See Fears v. Wilhelmina Model Agency, Inc., No. 02-Civ.4911 (HB), 2005 WL 1041134, at *10-11 (S.D.N.Y.
May 5, 2005) (stating that where the court has “discretion to distribute residual funds…cy pres principles permit []
the distribution of residual funds to a wide range of charitable organizations” and that the ‘courts’ broad equitable
powers now permit use of funds for other public interest purposes by educations, charitable, and other public service
organizations”); In re Motorsports Merchandise Antitrust Litigation, 160 F. Supp. 1392, 1394 (N.D. Ga. 2001)
(concluding that “Courts have expanded the cy pres doctrine to also permit distributions to charitable organizations
not directly related to the original claims”).
76
Motorsports Merchandise, 160 F.Supp. 2d at 1393.
77
Id. at 1396-99.
78
See Draba, supra note 58, at 154 (arguing that the court should have made “better choices” by distributing the
funds to organizations ‘nearer’ to injured consumers of NASCAR merchandise” such as “organizations whose
missions are aligned with traffic safety, driver education, or the prevention of alcohol-related automobile
accidents”).
79
Motorpsorts Merchandise, 160 F.Supp. 2d at 139.
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poverty law.80 In addition, the court also approved a $50,000 grant to a museum to create a
space solely for exhibiting glass art.81 A second case of a securities fraud class action, Jones v.
National Distillers, donated the entire residual fund sum of $18, 400 to the civil division of a
legal aid society.82
In creating a cy pres distribution that funded organizations unrelated to the case, the court
in Superior Beverage held that “the doctrine of cy pres and courts’ broad equitable powers now
permit use of funds for other public interest purposes,” even while acknowledging that the “use
of funds for purposes closely related to their origin is still the best cy pres application.”83 The
court in Jones attempted to find a tie between the issue of securities fraud and the recipient of the
residual funds.84 Admittedly, the tie was weak, although the court claimed that the legal aid
society bore some connection to the class action since the society’s civil division could
purportedly help people with civil securities fraud problems, whereas no connection would exist
if “the donation served an entirely unconnected cause such as a dance performance or a zoo.”85
There appears to be some confusion as to whether Superior Beverage and Jones actually
stand for the proposition that the cy pres doctrine has been relaxed, as far as it relates to class
action cases, in allowing distributions to unrelated organizations or for unrelated purposes.86
One commentator has suggested that the court in Jones did not intend to challenge the
conventional tenets of the cy pres doctrine but, instead, was forced to donate the residual funds to
an unrelated organization because there was “no obvious use for the money that provided a

80

Superior Beverage Co., Inc. v. Ownes-Illinois, Inc., 827 F. Supp. 477, 480-87 (1993).
Superior Beverage, 827 F.Supp. at 485.
82
Jones v. National Distillers, 56 F. Supp. 2d 355, 356, 360 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).
83
Superior Beverage, 827 F. Supp. at 479.
84
Jones, 56 F. Supp. 2d at 359.
85
Id.
86
See Draba, supra note 58, at 149 (contending that the tenuous cy pres distributions in Superior Beverage and
Jones should have been viewed as exceptions to the cy pres doctrine, rather than expansions, and that the courts
were constrained by the particular facts of the cases in deciding how to distribute the residual funds).
81
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particular benefit to class members.”87 The Jones court reasoned that because the class was
injured more than twenty years ago – “an eternity in the fast-changing world of securities
markets” – distributing funds to support securities fraud research or prevention would merely
benefit “participants in the global economy” and not the class members, particularly as it was
unclear how many of the claimants remained active stock investors.88 Nevertheless, the Jones
court relied on the Superior Beverage decision, which stated “[i]n recent years, the [cy pres]
doctrine appears to have become more flexible,” to conclude that the “absence of an obvious
cause to support with the funds does not bar a charitable donation.”89
III.

ALTERNATIVES TO A CY PRES DISTRIBUTION

A cy pres distribution is not the only method available to courts for distributing residual
funds. The three main alternatives are claimant fund-sharing, reversion of the funds to the
defendant, and escheat of the funds to the government.90 In consumer class actions, a fourth
alternative may be to order price rollbacks on goods or services used by class members.91
A. Claimant Fund-Sharing (Redistribution Among Class Members)
Class members who have already claimed and received their settlement compensation
often ask that any residual funds be distributed among them pro rata.92 The one compelling
argument for allowing this is that class members are the ones who directly suffered an injury
from the defendant’s actions, not third-party organizations or similar situated individuals who
stand to gain benefits under a cy pres distribution.93 Advocates of giving residual funds to class

87

Id. at 151 (quoting Jones, 56 F. Supp. 2d at 358).
Jones, 56 F. Supp. 2d at 358.
89
Id. at 359.
90
See generally Levi Strauss, 715 P.2d at 571-75; DeJarlais, supra note 43, at 748-59; Thomas, supra note 10.
91
See generally, Levi Strauss, 715 P.2d at 571-72; DeJarlais, supra note 43 at 753-55.
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members over charitable organizations assert “[It’s] [class members’] money. I don’t care how
much good you want to do. Do it with your own money, not someone else’s money.”94
The problems with claimant fund-sharing, however, appear to exceed the benefit
associated with this argument. Claimants are likely to receive a windfall,95 especially in cases
with large classes where, as previously discussed, many class members fail to submit claims for
various reasons, such as the impossibility of locating and notifying all members or members
finding it inconvenient to come forward when the individual award is miniscule. Furthermore,
claimant fund-sharing forecloses the indirect benefits that silent class members would receive
under a cy pres distribution.96 Another problem with claimant fund-sharing is that the
administrative costs of disbursing the residual fund to claimants may be excessive, thereby
making it a wasteful expenditure.97 All these arguments against claimant fund-sharing are
discussed in Van Gemert v. Boeing Co., where the court in rejecting plaintiffs’ request for a pro
rata distribution of the residual fund further postulated that claimant fund-sharing could result in
claimants intentionally concealing the pro rata redistribution plan from other class members in
order to gain a larger share.98 A claimant fund-sharing scheme, therefore, seems to be an
appropriate method of distribution only in a limited number of cases, such as those where the
majority of class members have come forward and received compensation.99
However, one exception to this general principle exists. While case law has not been
shown to support claimant fund-sharing in situations where claimants ask to share in a residual
fund after they learn that there is leftover money, courts do allow such a distribution when the
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parties in the class action foresee the possibility of a residual fund and expressly provide for this
type of distribution in the settlement agreement.100 The intent of the plaintiffs, like the intent of
the settlor in charitable trust law, is given precedence.
B. Reversion to the Defendant
Not surprisingly, just like many class claimants desire to partake in a residual fund,
defendants also frequently seek the return of any unclaimed money.101 Proponents of reverting
unclaimed funds to the defendant claim that, if the funds will not be used to compensate directly
class members, any other distribution constitutes an “unlawful forfeiture.”102 Two notable cases
held that reversion to the defendant is permissible. Van Gemert v. Boeing, a case that rejected a
claimant fund-sharing plan, held that a return of the residual fund to the defendant was fair,
considering that the defendant “had at all times acted without malice, without bad faith, and in
reliance on the advice of others (including two law firms)” when it breached its contractual
duties with the plaintiff class, which gave rise to the lawsuit.103 In approving the reversion, the
court ordered the defendant to publicize the existence of the fund annually for ten years and pay
any valid future claims made by class members who had not yet received compensation.104
The second case is Wilson v. Southwest Airlines, Inc., a case alleging that Southwest
Airline’s policy of hiring only attractive female employees violated anti-discrimination laws.105
Left with more than $500,000 in unclaimed funds, the court approved an agreement between the
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parties for the return of 64.5% of the funds to the defendant.106 As the Boeing court did, the
Southwest Airlines court looked at the defendant’s motive when breaching the law as well as the
defendant’s demeanor throughout the case. The court stated that, because
(1) the employer’s conduct was not based on invidious discrimination but rather
on a good faith interpretation of applicable law; (2) the employer had conducted
the litigation in a straightforward and unequivocal manner; (3) the employer had
acted quickly and in good faith to bring its hiring practices into compliance with
the law once the District Court’s verdict as to liability was rendered; and (4) the
policy of Title VII [anti-discrimination law] is compensatory rather than punitive
the defendant had an equitable claim to reversion of the funds.107
On the other hand, opponents of reversion cite California’s Supreme Court, which held in
Levi Strauss that there are strong public policy considerations against allowing defendants to
retain ill-gotten gains.108 In Six Mexican Workers v. Arizona Citrus Growers,109 the court held
reversion to be an appropriate distribution mechanism in only one circumstance: “when
deterrence is not a goal of the statute which the defendant has violated.”110 Since Six Mexican
Workers revolved around a federal law with a deterrent purpose, the Migrant and Seasonal
Agricultural Worker Protection Act, the aim of which is to “provide employment related
protections to migrant and seasonal agricultural workers,”111 the court dismissed reversion to the
defendant as a possible option for distributing residual funds.112
C. Escheat to the Government
A third distributive mechanism available to courts is to escheat residual funds to the
government. Theoretically, residual funds could be classified as unclaimed property, which falls
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under federal and state abandoned property statutes.113 However, courts have held that these
laws may result in two unintended consequences: it would disturb “the equitable discretion of the
courts in managing private consumer class actions” and “cripple the compensatory function for
the private class action.”114
A few cases have taken the position that escheat is permissible, most notably Six Mexican
Workers. This case listed two important factors to examine before ordering an escheat. First,
both a cy pres distribution and reversion to the defendant must be found inappropriate.115
Second, if escheat becomes an option, the escheat must serve “the deterrence and enforcement
goals of the substantive federal statute under which the suit is brought.”116
There are two types of escheat: “earmarked” and “unconditional.”117 An earmarked
escheat, as its name suggests, requires that the government earmark the given funds for programs
that benefit the class action’s next best class.118 In contrast, an unconditional escheat has no
restraints and simply indicates that the money will be placed in the government’s treasury to be
used as the government deems fit.119
In West Virginia v. Chas. Pfizer & Co.,120 the court ordered an earmarked escheat of
residual funds to several states.121 Since Pfizer was an antitrust case involving antibiotics
manufacturers, those states were required to use the funds for general public health purposes.122
One positive effect of earmarked escheat is the reduction of distribution costs since the
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government already has agencies established to provide public services.123 However, the
existence of these agencies can also pose a problem, as when the government lowers its own
budgetary expenditures on an earmarked program by the amount of the escheat award and then
diverts the extra funds to other projects that are completely unrelated to the class action and do
not benefit the injured class.124 Furthermore, the absence of benefits associated with the class
action suit is amplified when an escheat is made unconditionally since nothing prevents the
government from spending the money on programs that simply have nothing to do with the
case.125
D. A Situational Alternative: Price Rollbacks
In consumer class action cases, such as Levi Strauss, courts have the option of ordering a
price rollback to remedy the injury to the class. For example, the taxicab company that
overcharged passengers in Daar v. Yellow Cab was ordered to lower its fares until the residual
funds were used up.126 Another case that applies the price rollback mechanism was Colson v.
Hilton Hotels Corp., where hotels that had billed guests an illegal service charge for telephone
calls were ordered to apply $5 million in residual funds to reduce hotel room rates by fifty cents
per stay.127
While ordering price rollbacks as a remedy appears to be the most logical method to
counteract a defendant’s wrongful act of overpricing good or services, the result may not actually
benefit injured consumers.128 The problematic issues with price rollbacks are that non-class
members would gain a windfall if they were to take advantage of the reduced prices,129 whereas
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class members who choose not to or are unable to purchase the goods or services at the lower
price do not gain any benefit. Another group that could suffer a loss from a price rollback
consists of the defendant’s competitors, who would also have to reduce their prices in order not
to risk losing customers.130 In this sense, the price rollback mechanism appears to have a value
that is limited only to defendants that have no or few competitors,131 and in situations where it is
likely that a majority of the class members will continue to use the defendant’s good or
services.132
E. Abuse of Discretion and When Courts Cannot Make Up Their Mind: The Drama of the
Folding Carton Litigation
A scheme for distributing residual funds ordered by a trial court is not immune to a
challenge by the parties. On appeal, a higher court may overturn the distribution if it discovers
that the trial court abused its discretion.133 For example, in Kansas Association of Private
Investigators v. Joseph Mulvihill, the appellate court overturned the trial court’s order to donate
residual funds to two children’s charities, in a case in which a company of private investigators
sued the Board of Police Commissioners in Kansas City, Missouri for charging improper
licensing fees.134 The Court of Appeals concluded that the trial court had abused its discretion in
three ways135: first, by distributing the funds to organizations completely unrelated to the
activities of the parties in the class action; second, by not notifying the parties of the intended
distribution; and, third, by selecting cy pres recipients located in the county where the case was
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heard, even though both parties resided in another county.136 Citing Airline Ticket Comm’n, the
appellate court held that, when choosing to apply the cy pres doctrine, “funds must be distributed
to charities with interests as near as possible to the interests of the class members and those
similarly situation.”137 Even with the Court of Appeal’s finding of an abuse of discretion,
however, the class members still appeared to be irrevocably injured as it was unlikely that the
money given to the children’s charities could be recovered.138
Another case where the impropriety of the cy pres distribution was much more
pronounced is the so-called Fen-Phen scandal. In the 1990s, Fen-Phen (a drug regimen whereby
an individual would take a combination of two appetite suppressants – fenflueramine and
phentermine) was touted as a miracle weight loss drug cocktail until a medical study showed that
fenfluramine caused heart defects, resulting in the U.S. Food and Drug Administration pulling it
off the market.139 Three attorneys represented 441 users of the drug in bringing a class action
suit in Kentucky against the manufacturer of fenfluramine and won a $200 million settlement.140
However, only $74 million went to the plaintiffs, while the remaining $106 million was divided
among the three attorneys and a fourth “consultant” attorney, in addition to a $20 million cy pres
distribution made to the Kentucky Fund for Healthy Living.141 The Kentucky Fund was an
ostensible non-profit, charitable organization newly created and wholly managed by the four
attorneys, thus raising serious questions about their ethical conduct and duties toward their
136
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clients.142 More egregiously, the judge who presided over the case and settlement proceedings
was named a director of the fund and paid $5000 per month.143 Following this settlement, civil
and criminal charges of fraud were filed against the attorneys, and the judge was forced to resign
after Kentucky’s Judicial Conduct Commission declared his actions to be “disturbing,
inexcusable, and shocking to the conscience.”144
The cy pres distribution in this case – the creation of the trust fund – is not an unethical
remedy per se. The administrators of the fund claimed to have made several grants to public
service organizations, including a university medical center and a rehabilitation center145 which,
perhaps, shared some relationship with the issues of the class action or the interests of the class
members. What gave rise to the notion of impropriety, however, is the way in which the cy pres
distribution was handled. The attorney representing the four attorneys in the fraud case argued
that it was common for a settlement to yield residual funds and for those funds to be used for
charitable purposes.146 The attorney further contended that the claimants in the class action were
simply upset after learning that they could not share in a redistribution of the remaining funds as
doing so would give them an unfair windfall.147 However, the plaintiffs in the class action
alleged that they were never told the total amount of the settlement as they could not have found
out through public records because they were sealed at the defendant’s request, and that they
were intimidated by the attorneys into agreeing to the creation of the trust fund.148 Moreover,
there does not seem to be any de jure precedent in class action settlements where the plaintiffs’
attorneys and the court have full control over residual funds and derive financial benefits from
142
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them. Clearly, in the Fen-Phen scandal, the covert settlement agreement and the lack of
information given to the class members constituted an abuse of the judicial system, raising the
need for a mechanism to prevent such abuses from recurring, an issue that will be addressed in
Part IV below.
As seen in the Kansas Ass’n of Private Investigators and the Fen-Phen case, an abuse of
discretion is generally only found where the defendant has engaged in conduct that shocks the
conscience. The following series of cases, collectively referred to as the Folding Carton
Antitrust Litigation,149 show how easily courts can disagree on the issue of distributing residual
funds and the differences in opinion as to whether a decision shocks the conscience, both of
which reflect the vast amount of discretion that courts have in deciding this matter.150
In In re Folding Carton Antitrust Litigation, commercial purchasers of folding cartons
brought allegations of price-fixing against the manufacturers, who eventually settled for $200
million.151 After distribution, $6 million remained, which the district court ordered to be used to
create “The Antitrust Development and Research Foundation,” a foundation that the court
believed would “serve the Sherman Act policies of antitrust enforcement, deterrence and fair
competition while providing some indirect benefit not only to the uncompensated members of
the plaintiff class, but also to the general public, the ultimate consumers of folding cartons….”152
On appeal, the circuit court held that the district court’s order was an abuse of discretion,
because there were already so many organizations that had conducted “voluminous research” on
antitrust litigation that creating another one was analogous to “carry[ing] coals to Newcastle.” 153
The circuit court, instead, recommended that the residual funds escheat to the federal
In re Folding Carton Antitrust Litigation, 557 F.Supp. 1091 (N.D. Ill. 1983), aff’d in part.
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government, because it seemed unlikely that any additional claimants would come forward given
that five years had elapsed since the settlement was first approved in 1979.154
Nevertheless, the parties to the class action did not follow this recommendation, but
agreed to a distribution plan where half of the residual funds would be paid to existing claimants
and the other half would be donated to law schools for antitrust research projects.155 In response,
the government, which would have benefited under the circuit court’s escheat recommendation,
filed an untimely appeal to have the new settlement voided.156 Due to the un-timeliness of the
petition, the circuit court was forced to dismiss the government’s motion, but re-emphasized that
its earlier opinion “against using the funds for antitrust purposes remains and shall not be
circumvented by the parties or the district court.”157
The Federal Judicial Center Foundation, a “government agency responsible for providing
education and training services to all judicial personnel,”158 was mentioned by the circuit court as
a potentially valid recipient of the residual funds, even though the foundation had no relation to
the class action’s issues or interests of its members.159 The seemingly biased preference of the
circuit court’s judges for the federal government is evidenced, first, through their order to escheat
the funds and, second, by their choice of a congressionally-created agency.160 On remand, the
district court reviewed a number of grant proposals, including one from the Federal Judicial
Center Foundation, but decided that all the remaining funds should be distributed to the National
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Association for Public Interest Law to create fellowships for attorneys working in public interest
organizations.161 The court reasoned that the fellowships would benefit the following groups,
none of which were related to the class action: recipients of public legal services; graduating law
students interested in practicing public interest law; public interest organizations that generally
have difficulty acquiring sufficient funds; and society as a whole by helping individuals who do
not have access to the legal system and, therefore, for these reasons, the fellowship program
would be “appropriate under the cy pres doctrine.”162
F. Cy Pres Distribution as the Better Alternative
Judging from the negative aspects of the four alternatives to the cy pres distribution
mechanism (most notably, the inability to provide benefits to silent class members), it appears
courts should favor the use of a cy pres distribution as much as possible. The alternatives should
not be totally discounted, however, as they have been shown to have value in certain situations
and, indeed, could be used in conjunction with a cy pres distribution, if doing so provides greater
benefits to all class members – both silent and active – and the issues underlying a class action
lawsuit.
When applying the cy pres doctrine, courts should undertake to apply first the traditional
principles of the doctrine, that is, to take into consideration the interests of the class members,
issues of the class action, and other factors relevant to the lawsuit. A cy pres distribution that
does not reflect any of these factors raises questions concerning impropriety and bias (even if the
court claims the cy pres doctrine has been expanded to allow distributions to any charitable
organization). Tenuous applications of the cy pres doctrine often lead to appeals on the ground
of abuse of discretion and, moreover, before the matter can be resolved, the funds may be
161
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misspent,163 thereby resulting in an inefficient judicial process, economic waste, and unfairness
to the parties. The only two exceptions in which the cy pres doctrine should be relaxed or
altogether discarded are, first, when there is a rational basis for being unable to accomplish
traditional cy pres objectives, such as demonstrated in Jones v. National Distiller, and, second,
when the parties mutually agree to do so.
IV.

REGULATION OF CY PRES DISTRIBUTIONS

Until recently, there were no federal or state laws mandating the terms of a cy pres
distribution. Due to the historical nature of the cy pres doctrine as an equitable power, courts
have vast discretion in applying the doctrine to formulate a remedy, provided that, in the area of
trust law, the settlor’s intent is fulfilled as closely as possible.164 A court’s approval or
disapproval of a cy pres distribution is given deference, and should only be overturned in
instances where there is a showing of an abuse of discretion.165
However, in 2006, Washington became one of the first states to place a limitation on the
highly discretionary task of distributing residual funds. The Washington Supreme Court
amended the state’s civil rule on class actions to require that no less than 25% of residual funds
from a class action settlement be given to the Legal Aid for Washington Fund (LAW Fund), a
privately-established foundation that provides funding for statewide legal aid services.166 Not
only does the amendment benefit the legal aid community, but it is unique in that it also codifies,
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in general terms, the traditional concepts of the cy pres doctrine: “The court may disburse the
balance of any residual funds…to any other entity for purposes that have a direct or indirect
relationship to the objective of the underlying litigation or otherwise promote the substantive or
procedural interests of members of the certified class.”167
Prior to this codification, only two other states had similar laws with respect to legal aid
funding: California allows, but does not mandate, courts to set aside a portion of residual funds
for legal aid organizations and North Carolina, as of 2005, requires all unclaimed funds to be
split evenly between two organizations (The Indigent Person’s Attorney Fund and the North
Carolina State Bar) that provide legal services to indigent persons.168
The state legislature in Illinois has since followed suit in imposing legal restrictions on
the distribution of residual funds in class action settlements. Effective July 1, 2008, a new statute
requires that:
An order approving a proposed settlement of a class action that results in the
creation of a common fund for the benefit of the class shall, consistent with the
other Sections of this Part, establish a process for the administration of the
settlement and shall provide for the distribution of any residual funds to one or
more eligible organizations, except that up to 50% of the residual funds may be
distributed to one or more other nonprofit charitable organizations or other
organizations that serve the public good if the court fins there is good cause to
approve such a distribution as part of a settlement.169
What this statute essentially requires is that residual funds from a class action settlement
decided in Illinois must be given to, at least, one “eligible organization,” which is defined as a
not-for-profit organization that “has a principle purpose of promoting or providing services that
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would be eligible for funding under the Illinois Equal Justice Act.”170 The Illinois Equal Justice
Act, passed in 1999, established the Illinois Equal Justice Foundation, which “distributes funding
appropriated by the State to support not-for-profit legal aid programs.”171 The basic premise of
the Act and the Foundation is that all residents of Illinois, regardless of income, are entitled to
have access to the justice system.172
Mandating that a portion of cy pres funds be distributed to support legal aid organizations
is a partial solution by states to remedy cutbacks in government funding to these organizations.
The concept has been heavily promoted by legal aid organizations and seized on by judges who
lacked knowledge of the cy pres doctrine or its applicability to class action suits.173 The
question, then, becomes whether it is appropriate or beneficial for states to sanction this “cy
press movement”174 and, ultimately, change the underlying premise of the traditional cy pres
doctrine, of requiring funds to be paid, in part, to organizations that serve the public good,
irrespective of whether these organizations have a nexus to the original class action. The
difficulty in answering this question lies in the tentative balance between the importance of
upholding a utilitarian social policy and preserving the autonomy and rights of class members.
In a case like Folding Carton Litigation, where a proposal was made to form an unneeded
antitrust research foundation using millions of dollars from residual funds, the answer seems to
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point toward having a law that requires some of the funds to be channeled towards uses that
provide greater social benefits and, thus, militate against wasteful spending. On the other hand,
in a case like Motorsport Merchandise, where funds were given to organizations unrelated to the
class action, even though there were plenty of other charities that were relevant to the lawsuit
and that would have provided beneficial social services had they received funding,175 such a law
might further dilute the cy pres doctrine’s protection of class members.
Nevertheless, these laws appear to be far more beneficial than had they not been enacted.
The goals of ensuring equal justice and maintaining the interests of class members are both met
through these laws, as only a small portion of residual funds are required to be distributed to
public service organizations. Furthermore, laws like the Illinois act have incorporated
procedures that safeguard against abuse of the funds through measures that increase the
accountability and transparency concerning the distribution of the funds. For example, the
Illinois act prohibits the donation of funds for uses such as lobbying, political activities, labor or
anti-labor activities, and demonstrations.176 Recipients of funds must submit an annual report to
the Illinois Equal Justice Foundation detailing their expenditures and containing either an audit
or fiscal review of the funds.177 In turn, the foundation’s board must submit an annual report to
state officials and the state supreme court listing the amounts of distributions, the identities of
recipients, and the costs and balance of the total fund.178 The reports from both the recipients
and the foundation are a matter of public record.179
If legislative control over the distribution of residual funds for legal aid purposes aims to
provide accountability and transparency, the next question becomes whether the distribution of a
175
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class action’s entire residual fund should be regulated by the government under identical
provisions. Certainly, there are strong public interests in preventing another Fen-Phen scandal or
even cases, like Kansas Ass’n of Private Investigators and Holding Carton Litigation, where
favoritism was evident in the distributions.
Government supervision, insofar as it requires the submission of financial reports from
recipients of residual funds and/or any trust funds managing the money, is merely extraneous.
Many courts already require recipients to keep the court informed on the details of their
expenditures and, indeed, even before distributions are decided, courts review potential
recipients’ grant proposals and, frequently, choose those organizations that have demonstrated
the ability to disburse funds with the least amount of administrative costs.180 If government
supervision were present, however, and a problem involving the expenditure of residual funds
were to arise, then the government would have to participate actively in investigating and
resolving the issue. This may not be the best solution and could create complications for various
reasons, one being that the government would not have the same level of knowledge of the case
that the court and the parties would and, therefore, would not be in a position to make the best
assessment for the parties and issues involved. Furthermore, the government has its own agenda
and interests which may conflict with the interests of the class members. Any government
interference with judicial discretion is also likely to be met with resistance. The flexibility and
discretion afforded to the court and parties in their equitable application of the cy pres doctrine is
a fundamental part of defending the relevant interests and issues arising from a class action
lawsuit and for providing checks on the legislative branch’s authority over the judiciary.
Similarly, the arguments against having increased government regulation over the
distribution of residual funds also militate against creating an independent commission to
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oversee cy pres distributions. The independent body would not have the same understanding of
the case and, therefore, would not be in the best position to determine the allocation of funds as
would the presiding judge. Moreover, the ‘independence” of the individuals sitting on the
commission could not be guaranteed, especially given the intense lobbying efforts of potential cy
pres recipients. If a cy pres distribution carries suspicions of bias, it would be far easier for an
appellate court to examine the interests and ties of a single judge than it would be for the court
to have to inquire into the operations of multiple organizations.
Thus, the more effective remedy to ensuring that cy pres distributions are made
appropriately and free of abuse is to create a system that provides transparency to class action
settlement proceedings. Abuses of discretion, as in the Fen-Phen scandal, are not discovered
until it is too late. A mechanism is needed to help not only class members, but also the general
public, ascertain any self-serving interests that someone involved with the class action suit may
have in proposing a particular cy pres distribution plan.
The question, therefore, arises as to how we ought proceed. I would propose the creation
of a public electronic database – the Cy Pres Clearinghouse – that actively tracks all class action
settlements and provides easily searchable information on the interests or partialities that the
class action participants may have.181 The information that would need to be gathered begins
with the identities of those involved with each class action settlement, namely, the judge, counsel
for the parties to the litigation, the class representatives, and the recipients of cy pres awards.
For each participant, information should be listed regarding its publicly-known interests. For
example, the information on a judge would include membership in any organizations, alma
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mater,182 and any prior class actions over which he or she has presided. For the recipients of
residual funds, the information would include the organizations’ primary objective, the identities
of the directors and officers, publicly-available information on whether any of the directors or
officers share a personal or professional relationship with any of the participants in the class
action, and details on whether the organization has previously received residual funds from other
class actions, and if so, from which case and how much.
By creating this database, the hope is to increase the accountability of all participants by
placing them under greater public scrutiny. Greater accountability is necessary to ensure that the
cy pres doctrine is applied as it is supposed to be – by protecting and promoting the interests,
issues, and other factors that are at the crux of the class action.
V.

CONCLUSION

The application of the cy pres doctrine in the class action context is an innovative way of
achieving a fair result when other typical class action remedies are not feasible or available.
Over the years, courts have stretched the doctrine from its original concept under trusts law,
making it not just about fulfilling the intent of class members as closely as possible, but also
about considering the issues of the class action suit and the interests of the next best class, as
well as balancing the civic desire of promoting all public interests other than ones affiliated with
the class actions.
Given the flexibility with which some courts have applied the doctrine, residual
settlement funds have become more prone to being misused. If courts wish to continue using the
cy pres doctrine and call it such, they should revert back to a more traditional application – one
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that always looks first at how class members and the issues of the class action can be helped.
Furthermore, steps should be taken to increase the transparency of class action settlements in an
attempt to ensure that all class action participants become more aware of their accountability in
the hope that they will, in turn, take greater care in seeking to ensure that the cy pres doctrine is
fairly and properly applied.
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